Counter-intelligence in a command economy by Harrison, Mark & Zaksauskienė, Inga
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Harrison, Mark and Zaksauskienė, Inga. (2016) Counter-intelligence in a command economy. 
The Economic History Review, 69 (1). pp. 131-158.  
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/71034                        
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Harrison, Mark and Zaksauskienė, 
Inga. (2016) Counter-intelligence in a command economy. The Economic History Review, 69 
(1). pp. 131-158. which has been published in final form at. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12113 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes 
in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
First draft: 26 April 2013. This version: 24 November 2014.
Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy
Mark Harrison*Department of Economics and CAGE, University of WarwickCentre for Russian and East European Studies, University of BirminghamHoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University
Inga Zaksauskienė** Faculty of History, Vilnius University
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Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy
counter-intelligence. The agencies of the state that are assignedspecial competence in the sphere of struggle with the intelligenceagencies of other states and the disruptive activities of theorganizations and persons that they exploit. C[ounter-intelligence] isone of the instruments of the state’s political power.1
Our goal is to describe the role of the secret police in the Soviet commandeconomy. This topic is entirely missing from the standard textbooks onthe subject. The verdict of the late Alec Nove on secret policemen asagents for ‘inspection and control’ is typical:Nothing needs to be said about them in the present context, despitetheir importance in Soviet life.2And in a footnote:Large Soviet enterprises possessed, and probably still possess, a‘secret department’ staffed by secret police, which organized anetwork of informers. However, they were more likely to be roused bya disrespectful remark about Stalin than by, say, the overspending ofthe wage fund.This prompts a question: Is it possible that state security was embeddedin the Soviet economy’s basic units, and yet had no serious implicationsfor their working arrangements?The implications, we will show, were considerable. Using archivalrecords and other sources, we will describe how the KGB (Committee ofState Security or secret police) acted as a market regulator. Although thiswas a command economy, the communist state did not have the capacityto direct every resource from the centre, and it delegated most detailedallocation to internal and external markets. In these markets buyers metsellers, agreed prices, made contracts, and fulfilled them more or less –closely monitored from above.3
1 Nikitchenko et al., Kontrrazvedyvatel’nyi slovar’, p. 142
2 Nove, Soviet economy, p. 98.
3 Zaleski, Stalinist planning, pp. 490-2; Gregory and Harrison,‘Allocation’, pp. 743-749.
2
In market economies, the mission of the regulator is typically tosecure benefits for consumers and employees by limiting market powerand enforcing transparency and fair treatment. In a command economy,in contrast, everything was the other way around. We will show that KGBregulation in the economy served the ruling party, not the citizen. Insteadof limiting market power, the KGB enforced the ruling party’s monopolyof power, including its power over the economy and its monopoly ofinformation. Instead of providing transparency, the KGB enforced thesecrecy of government business, including economic secrecy. Instead offair treatment, the KGB enforced political discrimination in the market forskilled and supervisory employment. Each of these roles carriessignificant economic implications.The paper is organized as follows. Sections I to III consider therelevant literatures and our contribution, which is in the fields ofregulation and command economies. In Sections IV to VI we providebackground: the nature of Soviet rule, the Soviet conception of counter-intelligence, and KGB organization and resources. Sections VII to Xdescribe the structure and conduct of KGB counter-intelligence in theeconomy; based on evidence from Soviet Lithuania in the 1960s weexplain the role of the KGB in secrecy and management selection and itsuse of personnel records and surveillance to screen people andinvestigate events. This leads to Section XI, which considers theregulatory burden. Concluding, Section XII asks: what if the KGB had notexisted?
IOur paper contributes to two literatures: on market regulation, and on theworking arrangements of command economies.In market economies, government regulation is often proposed as thesolution to market problems. Consumers lose from anti-competitivepractices and hidden information, and also when legal contractenforcement is costly.4 Employees suffer unfair redistribution because ofemployer discrimination, whether preference-based or statistical.5Regulation can protect citizens by limiting market power, assuringmarket transparency, and ruling out unfair discrimination.These are the benefits that market regulation can secure, but thenproblems come thick and fast. Regulation incurs costs. Given costs as well
4 Anti-competitive practices: Pigou, Economics; costly enforcement:Shleifer, ‘Efficient regulation’.
5 Becker, Economics; Phelps, ‘Statistical theory’; Arrow, ‘Theory’.
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as benefits, economic theory recommends regulation up to a point wherethe excess of regulatory benefits over burdens is maximized.6 Thebeneficiaries of regulation, however, are not necessarily the same citizensthat will pay the costs. Costs are direct and indirect. The direct costs of theregulator are paid by taxpayers. Regulated firms pass on indirect orcompliance costs in higher prices to consumers or lower wages toemployees. Finally benefits, like costs, are hard to measure. The chancesthat the political equilibrium will coincide with the social welfareoptimum are slim.More generally, regulation is political. Governments and lobbies canuse regulation to serve multiple goals, including hidden purposes thatmay work against the public good. Because of this, Dieter Helm haswritten, ‘Economics can illustrate the costs and benefits of intervention,but not the desirability’.7
IIIn that context we turn to the literature on command economies of theSoviet type. It divides into two streams. Some economists (and economichistorians) have set out to investigate the Soviet-type economic system asa whole. Some historians (and economic historians) have focused onparticular issues that link security and the economy. Their findings havetended to face in opposite directions.Most economists have described the Soviet Union as a developmentalstate that provided public goods and pursued economic growth, althoughnot efficiently.8 While this tradition was always willing to acknowledgethe Soviet one-party state, the political economy of dictatorship has
6 Helm, ‘Regulatory reform’, p. 177; Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington,
Economics, p. 9.
7 Helm, ‘Regulatory reform’, p. 171
8 Allen, Farm to factory; Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft, Economic
transformation; Dobb, Soviet economic development; Ellman, Socialistplanning (1st and 2nd edns); Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness;Gregory and Stuart, Comparative economic systems; Hanson, Rise and fall;Hunter and Szyrmer, Faulty foundations; Munting, Economic development;Nove, Soviet economy; Economic history; Soviet economic system; Spulber,
Soviet strategy; Wilber, Soviet model; Zaleski, Planning; Zaleski, Soviet
planning.
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become more salient in post-Soviet reinterpretations.9 From theeconomists’ perspective, however, Soviet military power appeared to bejust a burden that got in the way of economic goals. The defence burdenaffected the system’s results, but the system could be understood withoutit. The fact that the Soviet command economy was used to support a massarmy and thermonuclear weapons was incidental to most textbookstories, as Vladimir Kontorovich and Alexander Wein have noted.10If the economists somewhat neglected the foreign aspect of a power-building dictatorship, then they entirely overlooked the domestic aspect.State security does not appear in the chapter headings or subject indexesof any textbooks on the Soviet economy or command economies, theireconomic history and development, or comparative economic systems.11It is missing from the essays published by the United States Congress JointEconomic Committee in periodic collections on the Soviet economy thatwere intended to inform U.S. policy makers.12 It does not feature in theonly readable, entertaining, and otherwise highly accurate novel everwritten in English about the Soviet economic system.13Of course the economists often acknowledged the abundant historicalresearch on the role of state security in periodic waves of repression, theuse of detainees for forced labour, the elimination of particulareconomists and statisticians, and so forth. In doing so, however, theytreated these events more as burdens on the system than as evidence ofhow the system worked.
9 Ellman, Socialist planning (3rd edn); Gregory, Political economy;Gregory and Harrison, ‘Allocation’; Olson, ‘Dictatorship’; see alsoWintrobe, Political economy.
10 Kontorovich and Wein, ‘What did the Soviet rulers maximize?’
11 In addition to those already listed see Campbell, Soviet economic
power; Eatwell, Milgate, and Newman, New Palgrave; Jasny, Soviet
industrialization; Kaser, Soviet economics; Kaser, ed., Economic history;Kornai, Economics; Socialist system; Millar, ABCs; Rutland, Myth; Schwartz,
Introduction; Wilczynski, Economics. Rare exceptions are a few pages byJoseph Berliner, Factory, pp. 289-293), and a fresh chapter in Ellman,
Socialist planning (3rd edn).
12 U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Soviet economy in a new
perspective; Soviet economy in a time of change; Soviet economy in the
1980s; Gorbachev’s economic plans.
13 Spufford, Red plenty.
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IIIHistorical research on Soviet internal and external security offers a greatcontrast to the picture familiar to most economists. Based on evidencefrom former Soviet archives, the historians have shown that externalsecurity considerations were decisive in critical moments of theeconomy’s development such as Stalin’s decisions to force the pace ofindustrialization, collectivize agriculture, and resettle, imprison, orexecute millions of ordinary people.14Historians have also documented many issues of Stalin’s time that linkinternal security with working arrangements in the economy. From the1920s the secret police were ever-present in the Soviet factory. Stalindistrusted the professional managers on whom he depended foreconomic results, expecting them to respond rationally to incentives bylying and cheating (as they did). He employed professionals such asplanners and statisticians to monitor the managers and report honestlyon trends in the economy; he also set the secret police to monitormanagers and other professionals.15From the 1920s, Stalin used periods of heightened political andeconomic mobilization to identify and isolate the persons he could nottrust. Economic officials were exposed to arrest and punishment whenthey did not support overambitious mobilization plans and targets, whenthey did not meet them, or because of some other weakness in theirperformance or record. From time to time conflicts erupted over the roleof the security police in oversight of the economy, as when higher officialssometimes tried to protect their subordinates. Stalin managed theseconflicts in such a way as to avoid any challenge to his position.16On one interpretation, Stalin used the apparatus of state security tomanage the economy and control underperformance through terror.17While this might have been an element in individual cases, it does not
14 Barber and Harrison, eds., Soviet Defence-Industry Complex;Harrison, ed., Guns and rubles; ‘Communism’; Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe
planirovanie; Khlevniuk, ‘Objectives’; Samuelson, Plans; Simonov, Voenno-
promyshlennyi kompleks; Schneider, Structure; Stone, Hammer and rifle;Velikanova, Popular perceptions.
15 Belova and Gregory, ‘Dictator’; Markevich, ‘How much control’.
16 Davies, Industrialisation, vol. 3, pp. 339-241; vol 4, pp. 82-84; vol. 6,pp. pp. 303-306.Gregory, Terror, 121-124; Kuromiya, Stalin’s industrial
revolution, pp. 162-172, 175-186.
17 Thus Manning, ‘Soviet economic crisis’, attributes Stalin’s decisionto launch the Great Terror to his disappointment with economic results.
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explain the waves of repression that broke over the economy. These werelargely unrelated to economic performance. R. W. Davies has shown thatwhen Stalin was preparing the Great Terror most economic informationreaching the Politburo was favourable.18 The peaks of repression aremore reasonably linked to times when heightened anxieties about foreignenemies increased Stalin’s desire to deal with the enemy within.19The implication is that, when Stalin’s secret police intervened in theeconomy, their purpose was to manage loyalty, not economicperformance. This distinction is not watertight, because Stalin’s secretpolice could and did look into plan failure for evidence of disloyalty. Ifthey believed they found it, however, their response was to remove thedisloyal elements from the situation, not to repair the plan, for whichStalin used other agencies.20Using terror to manage disloyalty, Stalin held onto unrivalled poweruntil his death in 1953. The costs were severe, however. Repeated purgesnot only destroyed millions of lives, but also extended upwards into thehigher ranks. Information flows to the centre were continuallycompromised by fear and because private grievances intruded into manyenquiries. For Stalin’s successors, reform of state security became a toppriority. The KGB (1954 to 1991) was the outcome of this reformistimpulse.To summarize, domestic security was built into the Soviet economicsystem in its formative years. The Stalin years do not foretell how thisworked in later years, however, because post-Stalin leaders wereresolved to put a stop to mass terror and they reformed state security toembody their resolve. For this reason, the role of state security in theSoviet economy under the KGB requires fresh evidence. The evidence isavailable from those former Soviet states, such as Lithuania, that havebroken decisively with the communist past and have opened their KGBarchives.Our contribution is to describe the KGB as a market regulator of themature command economy. Markets persisted under the commandsystem because the government did not have the capacity to direct manyresources in detail from above, and instead organized or allowed internalmarkets in which buyers and sellers were authorized or allowed to do
18 Davies, ‘Soviet economy’.
19 Harrison, ‘Dictator’. On Stalin’s fear of a domestic ‘fifth column’ in1937 see Khlevniuk, ‘Objectives’. On the 1920s see Simonov, ‘War scare’;Sokolov, ‘Before Stalinism’; Velikanova, Popular perceptions.
20 Markevich, ‘How much control’.
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business subject to regulation. The command economy had well-knownmarket regulators that planned the contracts, approved the prices andwages, set the working conditions and quality standards, collectedstatistics, audited accounts, and evaluated outcomes. Behind the sceneswas another regulator, the KGB, which supervised the economy’s keyfacilities and their employees and intervened so as to forestall threats tothe security of the regime and suppress disruption of its plans.
IVWe provide relevant background by describing what is known todayabout the system of Soviet rule, the Soviet concept of counter-intelligence,and the organization and resources available to the Soviet counter-intelligence agency – the KGB and especially its second administration.Our primary evidence is documentation of the Soviet Lithuania KGBheld in Vilnius, Lithuania, and also (on microfilm) in the HooverInstitution at Stanford University in California. The Hoover Archive holdsa million pages of plans, reports, correspondence, and otherdocumentation of the Soviet Lithuania KGB from 1940 to the 1980s.21This evidence is supplemented by a secondary literature contributed byLithuanian historians on the KGB in the system of Soviet rule.22From the documentation available we focus on the 1960s and early1970s. In these years Soviet rule grappled with new questions of politicsand economics. The political question was: How to rule? Stalinist violence
21 See the Lietuvos SSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas (KGB) Selected Records collection of the Hoover Archive, described athttp://www.hoover.org/library-and-archives/collections/east-europe/featured-collections/lietuvos-ssr (accessed 14 May 2014). Theoriginals of these records are to be found in the Lithuanian SpecialArchives (Lietuvos ypatingasis archyvas) in Vilnius, described athttp://www.archyvai.lt/en/archives/specialarchives.html (accessed 14May 2014).
22 Anušauskas, ‘Du aspektai’; ‘KGB reakcija’; KGB Lietuvoje;
Burinskaitė, ‘Buvusių kalinių’; ‘Kompromitavimas’; “Dezinformacinė 
veikla’; ‘Slaptosios tarnybos vieta’; ‘KGB propagandinės akcijos’; Grybkauskas, ‘Industrial management’; ‘Soviet dopusk system’; ‘State-
security clearance’; ‘Nomenklatūrinis sovietinės Lietuvos pramonės valdymas’; ‘KGB veikla’; ‘Second Party Secretary’; ‘Sovietine
nomenklatūra’; Juodis, ‘KGB veikla’; Okuličiūtė, ‘Patikimų asmenų 
vaidmuo’; ‘Lietuvos SSRS KGB vadovybė’; Rahi-Tamm, Jansons, and 
Kaasik, ‘Estonia i Łotwa’; Streikus, ‘Ideologinė cenzūra’; Tannberg, Politika
Moskvy.
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had been replaced by a softer, more paternal authoritarianism. Would thiscontinue to assure political stability?The economic question of the time was: How to grow? Since the 1930sSoviet rulers had searched for mechanisms that would combinemobilization with efficiency. In the 1960s the search became public withopen critiques of overcentralized authority and proposals to delegate itfrom Moscow to the regions and from ministers to firms and managers.23In this context we consider Lithuania, one of the smaller Sovietrepublics, with a 1970 census population just over 3 million. Four out offive residents were of local ethnicity; the remainder were Polish andRussian. Lithuanian ethnicity was strongly linked with Roman Catholicismand memories of nationhood. From 1918 until the Soviet annexation of1940, Lithuania was independent (and a province of the Russian Empirebefore that). From 1940 to 1953 Lithuania suffered repeated borderchanges, occupations, armed resistance, killings, and deportations.24 Onlyafter 1953 did Lithuania become peaceful again.In the 1960s Lithuania was just a part of the Soviet economy, whichwas still experiencing its postwar Golden Age. The sharp productivityslowdown of the mid-1970s was yet to come. According to officialstatistics (summarized in Appendix Table A-1), Lithuania’s populationwas less urbanized and less educated than elsewhere in the Soviet Union.Despite this, average living standards in Lithuania (measured by retailturnover per head in government stores) were no worse than in otherSoviet regions and probably better. The Lithuanian economy was growingand industrializing faster than others.Considered strategically, Lithuania had an importance in the SovietUnion beyond its size.25 A KGB status report of 5 January 1966 is typical.It lists Lithuania’s strategic location, the deployment of nuclear weapons(military facilities ‘of special importance’) on its territory, the presence ofimportant industrial and scientific facilities, the barely-suppressedmemory of a free and independent Lithuania, the existence of a largenationalist emigration in Western Europe and North America, and
23 Kibita, Soviet economic management; Kontorovich. ‘Lessons’;Markevich and Zhuravskaya, ‘M-form hierarchy’; Schroeder, ‘Sovieteconomy’.
24 Reklaitis, Cold War Lithuania; Statiev, Counter-insurgency; Weinerand Rahi-Tamm, ‘Getting to know you’.
25 Described by Lithuanian historians: Anušauskas, KGB Lietuvoje;
Burinskaitė, ‘Ideological and political aspects’; Grybkauskas, ‘Soviet dopusk system’; ‘State-security clearance’; ‘Second Party Secretary’;
Okuličiūtė, ‘Patikimų asmenų vaidmuo’; Streikus, ‘Ideologinė cenzūra’. 
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growing contact through letters and tourism between Lithuanians andforeigners, many with family ties. According to the report, the number ofpeople maintaining correspondence with relatives abroad is 430,000 (orone in seven of the resident population). There are 12,000 citizensclaiming German ethnicity. The number ‘returning to the republic’ (i.e.freed from imprisonment and exile to distant provinces after the death ofStalin) is given as 20,000, including 8,179 formerly active nationalists andpro-German collaborators, of whom 784 are being watched. Also undersurveillance are 132 ‘former agents’ of the imperialist powers. 26While some security risks (such as the lingering presence of the ageingprewar generation) should have diminished over time, others weregrowing. Rising numbers were permitted to travel between SovietLithuania and the ‘capitalist and developing countries’ on business or fortourism.27 Still, the annual total never exceeded 20,000, so by modernstandards Lithuania was extraordinarily isolated.28The special risks suggest that, when we study Soviet rule in Lithuania,we should first ask what we expect to find: a microcosm of Soviet rule ingeneral, or a particular case of colonial rule at the periphery? While someof Lithuania’s risks were specific, the template of rule that managed themwas the same one that Moscow used throughout the Soviet Union. Thistemplate was effective because it did not require any special talent orsensitivity to cultural differences to make it work. Ordinary people couldoperate it effectively, and it would be effective anywhere with little or noadaptation: Register the population, recruit an agent network to keepwatch over it, seize public and private records and lock them away,eliminate former elites, establish a state monopoly of housing andbusiness, and control or suppress schools, the media, and all civic andcultural organizations. The template was tried and tested in Russia,Ukraine, and Central Asia between 1917 and1939.29 Between 1939
26 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/644, 1-22 (Col. Obukauskas, chief of LithuaniaKGB second administration, report dated 5 January 1966).
27 Anušauskas, KGB Lietuvoje, p. 71
28 In 2011 Lithuania received more than one million visitors fromEuropean Union countries (so not counting visitors from Russia), asreported in Vakarų ekspresas, 29 June 2012, athttp://www.ve.lt/naujienos/ekonomika/ekonomikos-naujienos/uzsienieciai-pernai-lietuvoje-keliavo-daugiau-768088/(accessed 10 September 2013).
29 Described by Gregory, Terror; Shearer, Policing; Hagenloh, Stalin’s
police.
10
and1953 it was applied to new Soviet borderlands and extended toEastern Europe.30If this does not sufficiently rule out the colonial-rule hypothesis, it canbe further tested in other ways. Ethnic discrimination in Soviet politicalselection could be taken to support the idea of colonial rule. This was thecase at higher levels. In the non-Russian republics Moscow’s practice wasto appoint a person of local ethnicity as the first party secretary and aRussian as second secretary to act as ‘governor-general’.31 This practicepersisted through the Soviet period.At lower levels of the command system, in contrast, the evidence isthat ethnic discrimination was indirect and transitory. When the BalticKGBs were first established, for example, Russian personnelpredominated. This was predictable: regardless of nationality andresidence, KGB officers had to be party members, they could not haveremained on occupied territory during World War II, and they could nothave emigrants or armed resisters to Soviet rule as close relatives. At firstsuch criteria excluded most local residents from recruitment to the Balticsecurity services. Evidence from the archives, although incomplete,suggests that the local nationals’ share in KGB personnel converged ontheir underlying population shares over time – rapidly in Latvia, moreslowly in Lithuania (see the Appendix, Table A-2). This tends to argueagainst the idea of colonial rule.As for the economy, there is no sign of colonial exploitation.Lithuanians experienced the same command regime as others. By Sovietstandards, as already discussed, the Lithuanian economy grew andprospered.To summarize, while our evidence base pertains to Lithuania, andmany Lithuanians considered themselves to be in a state of colonialsubjugation, our message is not about colonial rule. It is about Soviet rulein general. When the KGB responded to events in Lithuania, its actionsfollowed the same pattern that was established everywhere under Sovietrule, including in Russia itself.
VA standard KGB source from our period defines counter-intelligence as:
30 Applebaum, Iron curtain; Reklaitis, Cold War Lithuania; Statiev,
Counter-insurgency; Tannberg, Politika Moskvy; Weiner and Rahi-Tamm,‘Getting to know you’.
31 Second secretaries in the Baltic: Grybkauskas, ‘Second partysecretary’; ‘Role’.
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The agencies of the state that are assigned special competence in thesphere of struggle with the intelligence agencies of other states andthe disruptive activities of the organizations and persons that theyexploit.32The documented principles of Soviet Lithuania KGB activity show thatthe KGB saw the threat posed by ‘the intelligence agencies of other states’as having two elements: spying and ‘disruption’. Seen in these terms, themission of KGB counter-intelligence was then preventive: to eliminatespies and suppress disruption.As far as spying is concerned, the sphere of information classified assecret was much larger in the Soviet Union than in most states.33 Virtuallyany information-gathering that went outside a narrow range ofauthorized channels of enquiry could be called into question.Despite this, the KGB of Soviet Lithuania caught few spies. As a seniorofficer noted (in 1968):Since 1958 we have not identified any cases of the undercoverplacement of hostile agents on the territory of the republic.34A wider goal of the adversary, however, was considered to be toestablish direct or indirect influence over people that were hostile orconfused with the aim of achieving ideological, political, or economicdisruption. This extension was important because, even if few hostileagents were caught, evidence that they might be present was easily foundin frequent signals that the KGB received concerning events and personsthat might be classed as disruptive.When the KGB received signals of potentially hostile activity, itevaluated them using an implicitly statistical methodology of detection.This methodology was rooted in the early history of the Soviet internalsecurity police, until 1934 the OGPU (later NKVD).35 From May 1931, theOGPU centre required local departments to submit two streams ofreports. Ordinary reports were produced monthly on the basis of
32 Nikitchenko et al., Kontrrazvedyvatel’nyi slovar’, p. 142.
33 Described by Harrison, ‘Accounting’.
34 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/663, 62 (undated transcript). See alsoHoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 14-23 (Lt. Col. Matulionis, chief of seconddivision of third department of the Lithuania KGB second administration,report dated 24 April 1968).
35 Described by Shearer, Policing, pp. 124-126, 130-133, 159-161.
12
summative statistics of activity. Extraordinary reports took the form ofevent-based narratives. Local officials asked the centre why it requiredboth. Shearer continues:The two types of reporting were necessary, explained an OGPU officialpatiently. These reports functioned together to not just to reportcrime, criminals, and police informant activities, but to build a‘normal’ profile of a region, and then to identify crimes that ‘falloutside the ordinary pattern’.Only this comparison would enable police officials:To identify and isolate, immediately and easily, any out of the ordinaryactivities, and the social types associated with those activities.Here can be seen a statistical concept of prevention that started fromthe implicit probability that a person or an event represented a securitythreat. This concept of threat perception strongly reflects the ‘dictator’sdilemma’: as the ruler’s power increases, so does the care with which thesubject hides inner feelings of disaffection that might lead to hostilethought and action.36 At the point when disloyalty is expressed openly,the dictator’s position is already threatened. To detect disaffection andforestall resistance, the dictator must watch for early warnings and act onthem, even if there is a lot of noise and many false alarms.When this concept was put into practice, we will see, the result wasthe profiling of persons and the screening of events. Persons wereprofiled on the basis that disloyal people as a group have sharedcharacteristics. These shared characteristics could then identify a personthat might be disloyal, allowing the KGB to intervene to isolate the personor change their behaviour. The identifying characteristics could bemarkers of past political weakness or guilt, based on historical records, orthey could be signals of current alienation or hostility, derived fromsurveillance.Events could be screened in the same spirit. This was a commandeconomy, vulnerable to disruption by any event not previously authorizedby a directive or plan. The mission of KGB operatives, in the words of oneofficer, was to watch out for ‘processes that are essentially anomalous,that is, incorrect, deviating from the general rule of processes and
36 Wintrobe, Political economy, pp. 20-39
13
phenomena’. 37 In Vilnius in 1968, as in Moscow in 1931, it was eventsthat ‘fall outside the ordinary pattern’ that could signal the presence ofthe enemy. Once identified, abnormal events could be investigated,leading to clarification of those responsible and their motives andconnections.The search for the hidden hand of the enemy at work could befrustrating. Typical culprits were as you might expect: natural causes,negligence, or private malice without political significance. It was hard tofind a case where sinister forces were truly at work. A KGB departmentchief lamented one year: 38In 1966 in the facilities of the republic no serious hostilemanifestations or ChP [chrezvychainye proizshestviya, emergencysituations] have been identified.Most likely the KGB shared the existential anxiety that afflicts otherpublic organizations with a preventive commission: How do you knowyou’ve averted something that hasn’t happened yet? When do you knowyou’ve done enough? And how do you justify the resources you have?
VIThe main resources available to the Lithuania KGB were its salariedworkforce and largely unpaid agent network. As far as employees areconcerned, Figure 1 shows that throughout the 1960s the KGB had a staticcomplement, numbering fewer than 1,200 officers, other ranks, andcivilians. Around 140 of these were specially tasked with counter-intelligence under the KGB second administration (including the KGB fifthdepartment for ‘ideology’, hived off from the second administration in
37 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 14-23 (Lt. Col. Matulionis, chief of seconddivision of third department of the Lithuania KGB second administration,report dated 24 April 1968).
38 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 1-9 (Lt, Col. Sudzilovskii, chief of thirddepartment of the Lithuania KGB second administratin, report 20 January1967). The general experience recalls a parallel in the Federalinvestigations of ‘sabotage’ (FBI Classification 98) in the United States inthe eras of World War II, the Korean war, and the Vietnam war (describedby Haines and Langbart, Unlocking the files, p. 97): ‘In almost all cases …no wilful acts of sabotage were discovered. Upon investigation the Bureauusually found most of the cases revolved around labor disputes andattempts to organize unions in plants, disgruntled workers, juveniles, andgreedy entrepreneurs who sought extra profits by providing thegovernment with defective war materials’.
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1967). But in practice most of those working in other units, for example,for surveillance and eavesdropping, and in the local departments in everytown and rural district, worked in support of counter-intelligenceactivities most of the time.The primacy of counter-intelligence is clear from evidence on the sizeof the informer network, shown in Figure 2. Informers fell into twocategories, agents (whose relationship with the KGB was formalized bysigned agreements and codenames) and ‘trusted persons’ (who had notsigned anything and were known by initials). Nearly all informers weresupervised directly by the second administration or indirectly throughlocal units.39 Informers were much more numerous than salaried KGBstaff and, unlike the latter, they increased rapidly through the 1960s.In a country of three million people the small number of KGB careeroperatives may surprise, but it should not. The KGB was a core element ofthe system of power, both as a channel of information and as aninstrument of unlimited authority. A large KGB could have threatened thepersonal authority of the Soviet Union’s rulers. From Stalin’s time, Sovietrulers knew the value of keeping such organizations small and close, witha tight rein on budgets and personnel.40Table 1 puts KGB resources around 1970 in perspective. SovietLithuania had approximately four KGB officers and informers perthousand residents. Lithuania’s figure is above the three per thousandfound in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, but far below the 17 per thousandEast Germans in the last year of their society’s existence. Poland wassparsely policed by comparison with the others, but the density of
39 One resource that does not enter into Figures 1 or 2 is the smallnumbers (between 8 and 10 throughout the 1960s and 1970s) ofsupernumerary operatives (vneshtatnye operativnye sotrudniki), usuallyofficers of the KGB and Soviet Army reserves, that the KGB placed in thesecure facilities that it supervised. As described by Nikitchenko et al.(1972: 55), their role was to coordinate the agent network, enforce theregime of secrecy, assist with surveillance, and so on. There were tensupernumeraries in 1964/65, 8 in 1971, and 9 in 1979: LYA, K-41/1/644,97-105 (Col. Sudzilovskii, chief of third department, Lithuania KGB secondadministration, reported dated 31 January 1966); K-41/1/688, 147-154(Col. Naras, chief of Lithuania KGB second administration, report dated 19April, 1971); K-41/1/755, 138a-148 (Col. Grishechkin, chief of thirddepartment, Lithuania KGB second administration, report dated 10
February 1979). See also Burinskaitė and Okuličiūtė, eds., KGB slaptieji
archyvai, pp. 52-61.
40 Belova and Gregory, ‘Dictator’; Gregory, Terror, p. 203; Markevich,‘How much control’.
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surveillance rose rapidly towards the end. On present knowledge thesedifferences are unexplained.By implication, surveillance assets were a scarce resource. How werethey allocated? If KGB assets were spread smoothly across Lithuania’sworking population, the result would have been 8 per thousand in everyworkplace. Figure 3 shows that the KGB economized by concentratinginformers on the places where educated young people were likely togather: schools, colleges, research institutes, and secure facilities. Byimplication, many backwaters were left unobserved. Given that allocation,a relatively small complement was evidently enough to keep Sovietsociety quiet for most of the time. ‘Most of the time’ may not have beengood enough in the long run, but even the Stasi could not hold EastGermany down forever.Like many organizations with a preventive mission, the KGB madelittle or no attempt to measure the efficiency with which it used its assets.Occasionally we find indicators of activity or case-load. As Table 2 shows,data were reported from time to time through the 1960s on verifiedalerts, cases (and persons) under investigation, and persons prosecuted.The numbers do not support an image of information channels crowdedwith signals and vigilant officers worn out by heavy case loads. In thelater sixties, as the dissident movement got under way across the country,the average officer of the Lithuania KGB was having to deal with a coupleof signals during the year and was faced with perhaps one investigation.Prosecutions per officer were trivially low. In the course of a year onlyone in four agents and trusted persons was providing an alert that turnedout to have operational importance. Where the change in case loadindicators over time is known, they were falling.
VIIThe KGB was embedded in the economy through the second (counter-intelligence) administration’s third department. According to a documentof January 1966 the third department (26 operatives) was responsible forwork on the railways and air transport, important industrial facilities,research institutes, and civil defence organizations. It also regulated theregime of secrecy; it gave or refused clearance for access to classifieddocuments and employments, and it supervised foreigners when theywere visiting economic facilities.41 The third department is therefore atthe focus of our study.
41 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/644, 39-47 (Col. Obukauskas, chief of LithuaniaKGB second administration, report dated 31 January 1966). Otherdepartments of the second administration at the time were the first (41
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The third department’s responsibilities included building the agentnetwork; assigning staff and informers to carry out surveillance at securefacilities with a particular focus on employees with access to governmentsecrets; preparing for visits and exhibitions; and lecturing the workers atevery opportunity to watch out for suspicious behaviour and be on theirguard against ‘the adversary’s ideological diversions’.42The raison d’être of the third department in Lithuania deserves briefattention. Saulius Grybkauskas has pointed out that, while a number offacilities located in the republic were engaged indirectly in defence work,as a relatively agrarian border province Soviet Lithuania did not have anyof the specialized final producers of military equipment that wouldnormally qualify the KGB to establish a third department in Vilnius.43 Intheir absence, the local KGB justified the existence of a third departmentwith reference to the presence of approximately 2,000 politicallyunreliable persons in the industrial workforce.44 As détente set in, KGBreports consistently detected heightened activity on the part of hostileforces and among foreign specialists. The implication Grybkauskas drawsis that the local KGB was protecting its resources.The personnel of the third department were probably a cut above theaverage KGB officer. In 1977 three quarters of third department officers
operatives), responsible for foreigners and nuclear weapons; the second(47 operatives), responsible for anti-Soviet organizations, the CatholicChurch, intellectuals, and young people, and the fourth (18 operatives),responsible for penetrating hostile agencies and networks. In 1967 anationwide initiative reorganized the second administration’s seconddepartment as the KGB fifth department for ‘ideology’.
42 For a plan of work setting out objectives of the third department seeHoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 1-13 (Lt. Col. Akimov, chief of third department,Lithuania KGB second administration, report dated 4 March 1968). For anassignment of officers to secure (and some non-secure) facilities, seeHoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 111-119 (Lt. Col. Akimov, chief of thirddepartment, Lithuania KGB second administration, report dated 18 June1968). Lecturing the workers: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/656, 87 (Summary ofreport on reinforcement of the regime of secrecy at facilities of industry,communications, and transport, etc., dated 24 February 1966); K-1/3/668, 4-13 (Major Trukhachev, chief of Kaunas city KGB third division,report dated 12 February 1969); K-1/3/668, 179 (Major Trukhachev,chief of Kaunas city KGB third division, report dated 9 December 1969).
43 Grybkauskas, ‘KGB veikla’.
44 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 154-167 (Lt. Col. Akimov, chief of thirddepartment, Lithuania KGB second administration, report dated 19November 1968).
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had college degrees and all had experience of secondary schooling.45 Thiscompares well with the wider Lithuanian population, where less than 40per cent of those aged 10 and over had higher and secondary experienceaccording to the 1970 census (see the Appendix, Table A-1).A similar judgement applies to the third department’s informernetwork. In 1968 it comprised 239 agents and trusted persons. Thetypical informer was an engineer, with higher education, aged 25 to 50years and with 5 to 15 years’ experience as an informer. Most had noforeign language (all but 25), and no relatives abroad (all but 16), andmost were clear of compromising evidence on themselves or closerelatives (all but 13). Only five had been recruited under pressure (‘bymeans of compromising evidence’).46What did it mean to be a secure facility under KGB surveillance? As
Kristina Burinskaitė describes it, the territory of a closed facility was screened and secured from outsiders. Workplace conversations weremonitored and employees’ contacts with visitors were controlled. Foreignvisitors were excluded or, if admitted, were shown equipment andproducts designed to mislead, while secret activities were temporarilysuspended.47What kind of facilities were secure? In 1968 there were 107 (listed inAppendix Table A-3). We classify them in five categories:
 Economic regulators (3 facilities): Lithuania’s planningcommission, branch of the USSR state bank, and statisticaladministration.
 Science-based facilities (34 facilities): R&D services and electronicproducts.
 Location-based activities (26 facilities): civil defence, bordersecurity (including ports and airports), and topographicalactivities involving maps and aerial surveys.
 Network utilities (37 facilities): power, gas, and water, and railway,highway, mail, and cable and wireless services.
45 Grybkauskas, ‘KGB veikla’, p. 100.
46 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 92-94 (1968).
47 Burinskaitė, ‘Dezinformacinė veikla’, p. 101). Such visits required approval by the government in Moscow, after consultation with the KGBand Soviet Army general staff: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 29-30(Instructions on the procedure for application of rules of residence offoreigners and stateless persons in the USSR, excerpt dated 28 February1969).
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 Heavy industry plants (7 facilities): such as shipyards and fertilizerfactories.These facilities were distributed among Lithuania’s largest urbandistricts as shown in Figure 4. In this centralized society cities, industries,and political power had common origins, and the prominence of thecapital city is not surprising. Thus Vilnius had a monopoly of theeconomic regulators. More generally, we compare the distributions offacilities (in 1972) and of the urban population (in the 1970 census). Onthat basis, as noted under the figure, three other concentrations standout: science-based facilities in Vilnius, location-based activities in
Lithuania’s seaport Klaipėda, and network utilities in Šiauliai, a staging post for missile troops.Employment statistics place the ‘secure facilities’ and trends affectingthem in context. Figure 5 shows that the secure facilities accounted forless than one tenth of the Lithuanian public-sector (roughly, non-farm)workforce, but its growth rate (10 percent annually) was much above thatof the public sector as a whole (6 percent annually). Employment at the‘specially important’ defence subcontractors was growing particularlyfast (more than 12 per cent annually). Security clearances for the‘specially important’ facilities were also growing at 10 percent annually.The only slow-growing segment of the secret sphere was the KGB-regulated non-industrial facilities (such as railways).What did the third department actually do? Soviet regime security Therelied on a capacity to block unauthorized channels for information andaction of any kind. The KGB administered interlocking mechanisms thatupheld this capacity, including enforcement of the secrecy of governmentpaperwork, security clearance of personnel for access to secret business,and continuous KGB screening of persons and events for signs that wouldlead to investigation and intervention. We describe those systems beforeasking: if they did not exist, then what?
VIIIWe begin with secrecy. A regime of secrecy governed officialdocumentation, based on ‘conspirative norms’.48 Every Sovietorganization received secret plans and other instructions from higherauthority through a secure channel, maintained by its first or ‘secret’department. This, not listening for ‘a disrespectful remark about Stalin’,was the ‘secret’ department’s primary function. In turn, the firstdepartment was staffed by party members and supervised directly by the
48 Described by Harrison, ‘Accounting’.
19
KGB third department. Thus, the KGB enforced the regime of secrecythroughout the economy.When KGB third department officers came visiting, they inspected thesecret department and checked the storage and handling of secretcorrespondence for compliance with instructions (which were alsosecret). The instructions assured the security of secret documents atevery stage from creation through transmission and storage todestruction.Because government business was secret, no one could exercisemanagement responsibility in the Soviet economy without access tosecret documentation. This access depended on security clearances thatwere issued by the KGB third department. In effect there was a segment ofthe Soviet labour market where cleared personnel were supplied anddemanded – and supply fell persistently short.The overall number of security clearances in Soviet Lithuania isknown only for particular years and sectors. In 1979, according toGrybkauskas, 14,000 personnel had clearance at the highest level, ‘topsecret (special file)’.49 This was around 1 per cent of the public-sectorworkforce.50 Those cleared at lower levels were presumably morenumerous. We know (from Figure 5) that in the elite facilities of ‘specialimportance’ around one quarter of the workforce was cleared for accessto paperwork classified at any level, but this proportion was presumablyabove the average.On the evidence of Figure 5 the number of positions requiring accessto secrets was growing rapidly. Combined with the normal turnover ofemployees, this implied a significant demand for new security clearances.In 1973 the third department issued a total of 4,257 clearances.Sometimes clearance was refused, blocking a person’s further career. Theaverage rejection rate in 1973 was 7 percent.51The clearance system faced the KGB with two problems, both of whicharose from the economy. One was the growing demand for clearances,which strained KGB resources; the other was that rejections causedproblems for managers, who were reluctant to enforce them.
49 Grybkauskas, ‘Soviet dopusk system’, p. 80.
50 In 1979 the Lithuanian public sector employed 1,435,000 ‘workersand staff’ (TsSU, Nar. khoz. 1979, p. 390).
51 Clearances and refusals: Grybkauskas, ‘Soviet dopusk system’, p. 84.
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Rising demand for cleared personnel was driven by both real growthand inflation.52 Real growth was driven by the underlying expansion ofthe secret sphere. This expansion was driven by the steady, year-on-yeargrowth of Soviet defence spending, combined with the secure facilities’supply privileges which enabled them to grow at the expense of theirenvironment. Alongside real growth went a kind of grade inflation.Security classifications were arbitrary to some extent, and caution led toover-classification, so that new lines of work were classified while oldlines were not declassified. There were growing numbers of requests forclearance from facilities that were not secure but had links with securefacilities that they could not develop without clearance to visit. Finally,there was high turnover among cleared employees, whose replacementshad to be put forward for clearance. 53 The inflation was countered byperiodic reviews that cut back the number of posts requiring clearance:for example, by 30 percent in industry and science across Lithuania in1963, as Figure 5 confirms.54In the market for cleared personnel, supply fell short of demand. Theevidence of shortage is that the KGB kept uncovering persons withoutsecurity clearance in chains of secret correspondence. When they wereidentified, managers resisted instructions to exclude them and tried toavoid compliance by means of delay and negotiation.Full compliance with the clearance system was an impossible goal.Managers regularly nominated people for clearance whom the KGBconsidered obviously unsuitable.55 The clearance process was timeconsuming, and sometimes took so long that managers admittedpromotion candidates to secret correspondence before their status wasdetermined. When the outcome was rejection, the director’s firstheadache was to explain reversal of the appointment to the candidate by
52 Discussed by Grybkauskas, ‘Nomenklatūrinis sovietinės Lietuvos 
pramonės valdymas’, p. 36. 
53 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 112-13 (Major Trukhachev, chief ofKaunas city KGB third division, report dated 12 October 1967).
54 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 122 (Col. Petkevičius, chairman of Lithuania KGB, report to the KGB second administration in Moscow, datedOctober 1967).
55 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 105-120 (Major Trukhachev, chief ofKaunas KGB third division, report dated 12 October 1967).
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poor conduct or performance; the KGB could not be mentioned.56 Whenclearance was refused, managers not infrequently ignored the outcome. 57According to Grybkauskas, the KGB had limited capacity to manage ordiscipline passive resistance.58 Directors appeared to survive conflictswith KGB officers without suffering lasting career damage, implying thatit was worse to fail over the plan than to fail over security. On severaloccasions, for example, the KGB supervisor instructed the Elfa electricalengineering factory director to remove politically unreliable employeesfrom their duties. The director was reluctant to comply, given thedifficulty of replacing them. He successfully exploited the turnover of KGBsupervisors to delay action continuously, in one case for almost twentyyears. This marks a dramatic change in the political atmosphere sinceStalin’s time, when to ignore the NKVD was to sign your own deathwarrant.To summarize, by the 1960s it was feasible to work around the KGB.At the same time, ‘feasible’ does not mean ‘costless’. To play games withstate security surely took time, patience, and nerve. Notably, while theKGB could be put off, there is no evidence that its officers could be boughtoff. There are no cases on file of corrupt side-payments and no evidencesuggesting regulatory capture.
IXKGB security clearance for appointment to management positions wasbased on personal data collated from records and surveillance. Recordssupplied historical evidence, while surveillance added new signals. Thecollective term for this information was ‘compromising evidence’(kompromat), so-called because it raised some question mark over theperson’s loyalty. Loyalty could be put in question by a person’scircumstances or actions. Kompromat provided the KGB with theevidence base for it to discriminate over candidates for sensitive
56 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 101-104 (Lt. Col. Žilinskas, chief of ŠiauliaiKGB, report dated 16 September 1967).
57 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 24 (Lt. Col., Snakin, deputy chief of Kaunas
KGB,report dated 11 April 1958.); K-1/3/664, 29-36 (Col. Petkevičius, chairman of Lithuania KGB, report to the Lithuania communist partycentral committee dated 7 May 1968); K-1/3/670, 45-49 (Lt. Col.
Žilinskas, chief of Šiauliai KGB, report dated 30 January 1969).
58 Grybkauskas, ‘Nomenklatūrinis sovietinės Lietuvos pramonės valdymas’, pp. 37-39.
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employment and at other gateways such as applications for foreigntravel.59We extract more detailed insight into kompromat and discriminationfrom a small person-level dataset. In December 1972 the KGB of
Panevėžys (1970 census population 73,000) sent Vilnius details of 176 persons on whom their files held kompromat. The lists were compiled torespond to a request from the centre, based on concern about the extentto which people with kompromat were being granted access to sensitiveemployment and foreign travel. Listed separately were 6 persons clearedfor ‘top secret’ documentation (and therefore holding senior positions) inspite of the evidence; 10 persons refused clearance because of theevidence, but still retaining the senior positions for which clearance hadbeen sought; 96 persons refused permission to travel abroad because ofthe evidence; and 79 persons occupying senior positions in spite of theevidence. (The numbers sum to 191 but there was some double-counting,so 15 people were listed twice.) With a few gaps the lists provide eachperson’s full name (and so gender and ethnicity), year of birth, level ofeducation, party or Komsomol membership, occupational status and/orposition, and a summary of the kompromat in each case.The dataset is surely not the population of all those in KGB files, evenin a small market town. As a sample it would not be random orrepresentative. The people in it were chosen because they held relativelyimportant positions or because they had applied to travel abroad; neithermakes a typical citizen. Still the sample is suggestive of what the KGB sawas ground for suspicion.In Table 3 we classify the reported evidence along two dimensions:historical versus contemporaneous, and circumstantial versus voluntaryaction. As the table shows, the 176 people were the subject of 321 reports.Just over half the reports (167) could be classified as historical andinvoluntary, that is, the evidence reflected circumstances of the distantpast over which the subject had never had any control, such as conditionsinto which they were born or that were created by the action of others.The next largest categories related to contemporaneous circumstances(65) and voluntary actions that belonged to the historical past (55). Onlyone tenth (34) concerned voluntary actions that were current or recent.But since these 34 reports were associated with 34 distinct persons, theyalso represented one fifth of the 176 people in the sample. Some examplesillustrate the numbers.
59 Ledeneva, How Russia really works, pp. 58-90, describes post-Sovietuses of kompromat, attributing the term to ‘1930s secret police jargon’.
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Historical/circumstantial evidence (16 7 signals). The subject wasborn into a family of the pre-Soviet urban or rural elite; or was liable toresettlement under Soviet occupation in their own right or as a familymember; or a family member collaborated with the German occupation orresisted the Soviet occupation, or fled the country after the war; or afamily member was sentenced for ‘state crimes’.The KGB’s focus on past repression was well founded. Working from asurvey of Soviet war refugees in Europe and America, Inkeles and Bauer,created a measure of their respondents’ underlying (as opposed tosuperficial) hostility to the Soviet system and looked for determinants intheir life histories.60 They found that the single most important factor inhostility was ‘experience of arrest by the secret police of oneself or afamily member’.
Contemporaneous/circumstantial evidence (6 5 signals). Thesubject was in touch with a relative abroad, who might be (but did notneed to be) linked to anti-Soviet activity); or had a family member athome who was known to grumble about the regime; or was employed ator lived close by a secure facility. Having a relative abroad created aCatch-22. You want to travel to Germany because your brother is there.But the fact that your brother is there will be held against you askompromat. Thus, the reason that you want something becomes thegrounds on which it will be denied.
Historical/voluntary hostile action (55 signals). In the past thesubject collaborated with the German occupation or resisted the Sovietoccupation, or had been sentenced for ‘state crimes’ in their own right. Ofcourse many of those that supported German occupation acted undersome degree of coercion; equally, it’s debatable to what extent voluntaryaction was required for a conviction under Stalinist laws on counter-revolutionary crimes. Still, rightly or wrongly, many Lithuanians did havepro-German sympathies in wartime or chose to resist Soviet rule so thisclassification seems more reasonable than any other.
Contemporaneous/voluntary hostile action (34 signals). Finally,the subject violated Soviet norms of behaviour or demonstrateddisaffection by attending church; or by openly expressing anti-Sovietviews; or by having unauthorized contact with foreigners.We learn more by sorting the sample on the criterion ofcontemporaneous/voluntary hostile action. In other words, what werethe average characteristics of those that were showing a bad attitude inthe present, by comparison with those that were living under the shadowof past or present circumstances they could not control?
60 Inkeles and Bauer, Soviet citizen, pp. 265-280.
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Table 4 shows that those engaging in current or recent actions that theregime considered hostile were two years older and with two years lessof education. They were substantially more likely to be female and to haverelatives abroad. On all measures they were less likely to carry historicalmarkers of disloyalty. This is a product of selection, not of the agedifference, which has the ‘wrong’ sign (one would expect older citizens,having lived longer before Soviet rule, to have worse, not better histories.)Two differences are suggestive, however. One is that those engaged incurrent hostile activity were more likely to have relatives abroad. Anotheris that they were somewhat more likely to be party or Komsomolmembers.Beyond a few sums, the KGB did not do data analysis. What would ithave given them? Most likely, what they knew already from directexperience: People whose families were expropriated or penalized in thepast often harbour grievances in their hearts. Those that carry the stigmaof hostile social origins or associations have mostly learned to keep theirmouths shut, but some of the others have not. Party membership can be acover for disloyalty. Some of those that have won a party card against theodds think it gives them a license to say what they like.
XEvents, like people, could be profiled and categorized. One duty of thethird department was to identify events that were abnormal, andtherefore emergencies or ‘ChP’ (chrezvychainye proizshestviya) forinvestigation. These events were, by definition, deviations from the plandecreed by the party. Here more than anywhere, we see that the life of theKGB officer was just one damn thing after another. Emergencies werenumerous and frequent. In the fields, a hayrick burned.61 A train was lateor derailed. Factory equipment was damaged or employees wereharmed.62 Whose hand was at work? Did it belong to the foreign
61 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/627, 251-255 (Petkevičius, deputy chairman of Lithuania KGB, report dated January 1964); K-1/3/637, 37-40 (Lt. Col.
Jankevičius and Lt. Col. Kardanovskii, deputy chiefs of Lithuania KGB investigation department and second department of the secondadministration respectively, undated report).
62 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 61-62 (Lt. Col. Sarpalius, chief of Mažeikiaidistrict KGB, report dated 21 May 1969); 74-75 (Lt. Col. Sarpalius, chief ofMažeikiai district KGB, report dated 15 May 1969); 80-82 (Lt. Col.Tikhomirov, chief of Utena district KGB, report dated 22 May 1969); 116-119 (Lt. Col. Sarpalius, chief of Mažeikiai district KGB, report dated 9September 1969); 120-124 (Major Kazakov, chief of division of Lithuania
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adversary, or to some unnoticed person under their influence? Everyevent was logged and investigated.Unsolved cases were like toothache; they lingered, could not beignored, and were often hard to clear. Perhaps in the New Year of 1966
Lithuania KGB chief Randakevičius could celebrate: 63Much attention has been given to work on cases of unsolved ChP. Thiswas to implement the USSR KGB Collegium’s decision of 27 February1965. As a result, clarity has been achieved and measures adopted inseven cases of unsolved crime.A different kind of ChP was industrial conflict. Here the agency wasalways human. Significant stoppages were exceptional; go-slows, andwalk-outs at the shop level were more frequent (but sometimes poorlydistinguished from supply breakdowns). A brickworks in Šiauliai districtsuffered a strike in February 1968; three shifts, 150 person-days, and7,500 rubles of output were lost. The KGB reported the immediate causeof the strike as a fall in output leading to non-payment of bonuses forJanuary. The fall in output was in turn traced to … well, everything thatwas wrong with the Soviet economy: ‘fuel shortage, supply of frozenmaterials to the workshop, poor labour organization, lack of showers forworkers to wash after the shift, late provision of supplementary dinners,and the combine management’s insensitive and abrasive attitude to theworkers’.64 (No surprises there.)
Of greater interest is a dispute at a parts factory in Ukmergė district. In February 1969 the management decided to compensate foroverspending the wage fund by cutting piece rates. The workers went on
strike; a shift was lost. The Ukmergė KGB rushed to the scene. KGB Captain Ivanov held talks and listened to all sides. The managers’decision, he concluded, was correct, but it should have been introducedmore gradually and with more consultation. Ivanov maderecommendations: the managers must improve communication, and theworkers must return to work. The strike leaders had would be punished;
KGB third department (sic), undated report); 128 (Lt. Col. Lesitskas, chief
of Kėdainiai district KGB, report dated 9 December 1968). 
63 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/643, 1-16 (Maj. Gen. Randakevičius, chairman of Lithuania KGB, report to the USSR KGB in Moscow dated 7 January1966).
64 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 155 (Lt. Col. Akimov, chief of thirddepartment, Lithuania KGB second administration, report dated 19November 1968).
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one was a former state criminal.65 So, it seems, Alec Nove was half right:the KGB was not interested in ‘overspending of the wage fund’ as such –but it was interested in overspending if the result was disruption andconflict.
XIWhile distributing benefits to the regime, KGB regulation was costly.Costs were direct and indirect. Based on the records of the regulator, wecan show only the direct costs. The Lithuania KGB was a smallorganization, employing one per thousand of the workforce, so the directcosts of KGB regulation could not be large.Indirect costs may have been much greater. The KGB was small, butthe work of complying with its own directives on secrecy has been put atone third of staff time.66 This implies that regulated facilities also incurredhigh compliance costs. But only the records of the regulated facilities willpin this down, so it must await future research.The literature on regulation in market economies recognizes that theregulator is likely to know less about costs than the firm that is regulated.Because of this, regulation may have unintended consequences. Acting onignorance, regulation can incentivize firms to raise costs, dilute quality, orunderinvest in necessary infrastructure.67Applying these ideas to the Soviet context, we think of KGB regulationin the labour market as a mechanism that changed the incentives ofmanagers and employees. We consider each in turn.On the side of managers, KGB security clearance raised the cost ofrecruiting qualified personnel. In order to avoid delays and otherdifficulties, managers had an incentive to recruit personnel on knownloyalty before known competence. This would be bad enough if loyaltyand incompetence were unrelated, and worse if they were correlated.Egorov and Sonin have considered the loyalty-competence trade-offunder a dictator who values competence, but fears the challenge ofenemies and betrayal by his nearest supporters, and fears them more, themore competent they are. For this reason, they write, ‘loyalty and
65 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 26-27 (Lt. Col. Galvidis, chief of Ukmergė district KGB, report dated 5 March 1969).
66 Harrison, ‘Accounting’.
67 Armstrong and Sappington, ‘Recent developments’.
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incompetence are two sides of the same token’.68 The implication is thatthe dictator will select adversely for talent.69On the side of employees, KGB selection created more disincentives. Itraised the personal risk associated with investment in skills andqualifications because no one could be sure that that the KGB did not holdsome marker of disloyalty that would be used sooner or later to denypromotion. For some employees the risk of exposure of a dubious recordcould become a reason to avoid gaining the competences that would putthem in line for promotion. KGB regulation made a quiet life in a low-skill,low-wage environment preferable to seeking distinction and risking thescrutiny that would follow.Adverse selection of human capital and disincentives to acquire it inthe first place sound bad for human capital formation and economicperformance. But the command system was designed to minimize thedownside. The Soviet was organized to supply the means of nationalpower, such as capital goods and munitions, in the age of massproduction. Vertically integrated, standardized production relied onmanagers with literacy, numeracy, basic training, and people skills; therewas no return to unique talents or entrepreneurial vision.70 As long asthis model remained globally competitive, the command economy couldafford to forego some of the human capital and suppress some of thetalent that would otherwise have been supplied. The ‘chief adversary’ wasthe United States, after all, and the US economy also does not appear tohave recruited the brightest and the best for industrial management inthe 1950s and 1960s.71The age of standardized mass production was coming to an end,however. It began a century earlier as transport and communication costsfell to a level, ‘neither prohibitive nor trivial’, that allowed production tobe centralized and controlled on a large scale.72 As costs fell further, theSoviet economy had to face the flexible production and servicesrevolution that would transform the market economies. It is hard to
68 Egorov and Sonin, ‘Dictators’.
69 Likewise Brus, Socialist ownership, p. 200, concluded fromexperience that communism tended to ‘negative selection’ of personnelfor ‘servility and conformity’.
70 Thus Berliner, Factory, emphasized networking as a key skill of theSoviet manager, along with mastery of ‘simulation’ and the ‘safety factor’.
71 Halberstam, Reckoning; Johnson, ‘Managing’.
72 Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin, ‘Beyond markets’, p. 430.
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imagine the labour market of a ‘post-industrial’ economy working wellunder KGB regulation.There is no evidence, though, that the KGB ever looked into the hiddencosts or unintended consequences of its counter-intelligence role. Thesewere questions that no one needed to ask.
XIIWhy should economic historians pay attention to the secret police in thecommand economy? A short answer is that secret policemen paid muchattention to economic matters. Why and how and with what implicationsfor the working arrangements and performance of the command systemare questions that have rarely been posed.The counter-intelligence function of the KGB was embedded in theSoviet economy through the officers and agent network of the secondadministration’s third department. Through its third department, the KGBbecame a regulator of the command system.Like a market regulator in an open society, the KGB had preventiveand protective functions. There the similarity ends. Where a market-economy regulator might aim to shield the citizen from monopoly power,the KGB’s mission was to shield the regime by preventing the leakage ofgovernment business and hostile disruption of the planned economy.Where a market-economy regulator might work to reduce unfairtreatment and information asymmetries, the KGB acted to enforce secrecyand political discrimination.The KGB carried out its preventive mission by profiling persons andscreening events for markers of hostile influence or disloyalty. Itsobjectives were to prevent disloyal persons from gaining access togovernment business and to suppress their influence over events.The significance of an organization can be judged by what might havehappened if it did not exist. Open societies are continually ‘disrupted’because competent citizens who are critical of the ruling order intrudeinto government business so that its business is leaked, triggeringdemands for public accountability. Independently of the government,people join together to change the status quo with disruptive innovations,or to resist corporate plans and government policies. In the commandeconomy all these activities were classified as disruptions that ought to besuppressed, and it was the special function of KGB counter-intelligence tosuppress them.Put that way, our question has a clear answer. Without anorganization committed to ‘counter-intelligence’ as the KGB defined it, theSoviet state would have been unprotected against disloyal citizens. Itsplans would have been disrupted by unauthorized initiatives. Its business
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would have become known to the citizens. Unofficial representativeswould have demanded explanations and even a say.In order to preserve the Soviet command hierarchy, KGB counter-intelligence imposed regulatory burdens, as yet unmeasured, on theeconomy. Compliance costs were large enough that we find someevidence of evasion. There was also a cost to human capital formation inthe systematic exclusion of talented, potentially disloyal citizens fromselection for management. But the command economy, just like statesecurity, was designed to be managed by ordinary people with basictraining; it did not demand gifted free-thinkers.Our subject suggests several avenues for future research. To theextent that previous scholarship has ignored the counter-intelligencefunction, it has neglected to measure the burdens associated with it. KGBrecords give us reason to think these burdens existed, but do not tell ushow large they were. Research in the records of the facilities that wereregulated by the KGB may shed further light.Beyond this, we would like to know how security regulation affectedthe growth, slowdown, and collapse of the Soviet economy, and whether itwas a factor in the varied outcomes of command economies from Europeto East Asia and Cuba. Did the Soviet economy collapse because KGBmarket regulation failed, or because it worked too well? At present wehave no answers. Such questions call for a differences-in-differencesapproach over space and time based on data from comparative studiesthat do not yet exist. But one day they will.
Figure 1. Lithuania KGB employees, 1961 to 1971 (selected years)
Sou rce:Anušau s kas ,KGB Lietuvoje,p .4 3 .The originaldata are rep ortedfor alternate y ears ,1 961 to 1 97 1 .N otes :The KGBs ofthe Union Rep u b lics , s u ch as Lithu ania,w ere directlys u b ordinate to the USSR KGB in M os cow ,and their internals tru ctu resw ere aligned to follow M os cow .In the 1 960 s ,according to Andrew andGordiev s ky ,Inside story,p p .550-1 ,the USSR KGB w as organiz edfu nctionally on the follow ing s chem e;thos e that find a localm atch in thefigu re are s how n in b old.
 Firs t chiefadm inis tration:foreign intelligence.
 Second chief administration:cou nter-intelligence.
 Third adm inis tration:m ilitary cou nter-intelligence.
 Fou rth adm inis tration:trans p ort.
 Fifth administration (from 1 967 ;b efore that,the s econddep artm ent ofthe s econd chiefadm inis tration):ideology .
 Seventh administration:s u rv eillance.
 Eighth chiefadm inis tration:gov ernm ent com m u nications .
 N inth adm inis tration:gov ernm ent p rotection.
 Chiefadm inis tration ofb order troop s .There w ere m any au x iliary u nits not s u b ordinate to anyadm inis tration,s u ch as theoperational-technical department andother u nits res p ons ib le for inv es tigation,records and archiv es ,intercep tion ofcorres p ondence,eav es drop p ing,finance,p ers onnel,thes ecretariat,and s o forth.At the low es t lev el(the city and ru raldis trict) KGB territorialu nitsw ere not fu nctionally s p ecializ ed.In Sov iet Lithu ania there w ere 3 6 localdep artm ents in 1 961 ,falling to 28 in 1 967 ;as can b e s een,the nu m b er ofp ers onnelrem ained ap p rox im ately u nchanged.
Figure 2. The Lithuania KGB informer network, 1961 to 1971 (selected
years)
Sou rce:Anušau s kas ,KGB Lietuvoje,p p .8 8 ,94 .The originaldata arerep orted for alternate y ears ,1 961 to 1 97 1 .
Figure 3. The Lithuania KGB informer network: density in selected facilities
and years
Sou rces and notes :Inform ers are the s u m ofagents and tru s ted p ers ons .For inform ers am ongs t the w orking p op u lation,nu m b ers for 1 969 and1 97 1 (as Figu re 2) are av eraged and com p ared w ith the w orkingp op u lation from Ts SU,Nar. khoz. 1922-1972,p .601 .For the Jonav afertiliz er factory s ee H oov er/LYA,K-1 /3 /696,1 -3 (M ajor Barts is ,chiefofJonav a dis trict KGB,rep ort dated 26 Octob er 1 97 1 ).For the Baltijas hip y ard s ee H oov er/LYA,K-1 /3 /7 1 1 ,93 -1 0 3 (Firs t Lt.Ku likov ,and Cap t.Petrikas ,res p ectiv ely op erativ e com m is s ioner for and chiefofthe firs tdiv is ion,KGB ofKlaip eda and the Lithu anian s eab oard,rep ort dated 20M ay 1 97 4 ).The Baltija s hip y ard w as “know n”to b e a target for foreignes p ionage according to H oov er/LYA,K-1 /3 /7 1 1 ,1 04 (Lt.Col.N aras ,chiefofLithu ania KGB s econd adm inis tration,m em o dated 7 M arch 1 97 4 ).ForKN IIRIT s ee H oov er/LYA,K-1 /3 /668 ,1 20-1 24 (M ajor Kaz akov ,chiefofdiv is ion ofLithu ania KGB third dep artm ent (s ic),u ndated rep ort).For theLithu ania dis trict p ow er s tation,s ee H oov er/LYA,K-1 /3 /7 1 1 ,8 6-92(Firs t Lt.N orb u tas , s enior op erativ e com m is s ioner for Trakaidis trictKGB,rep ort dated 1 2 Sep tem b er 1 97 4 ).The dens ity ofinform ers inedu cationalfacilities is com p iled from figu res giv en in H oov er/LYA,K-1 /3 /63 0,64 -7 8 (Lt.Col.N aras ,chiefofs econd dep artm ent,Lithu ania KGBs econd adm inis tration,rep ort dated Ap ril1 963 ).
Figure 4. KGB-regulated facilities in Soviet Lithuania, June 1968, by city and
type
Sou rce:The 1 07 regu lated facilities are lis ted in Ap p endix Tab le A-3 .N otes :Cities are ranked from left to right in declining order ofres identp op u lations according to the All-Union Cens u s ofPop u lation ofthe USSRfor 1 97 0,av ailab le from Dem os cop e W eekly athttp ://dem os cop e.ru /w eekly /s s p /u s s r7 0_reg2.p hp(acces s ed 22 M ay201 3 ).Bas ed on the s am e data w e find fou r concentrations offacilities ,w here a concentration is defined as at leas t tw o facilities w ithin a giv engrou p ,w here the nu m b er offacilities ofthat grou p w as at leas t tw ice thenu m b er p redicted b y the tow n’s s hare ofthe u rb an p op u lation.Thes ew ere (1 ) econom icregu lators and (2) s cience-b as ed facilities in
Lithu ania’s  cap ital city  Vilniu s  (3 ) location-b as ed activ ities  in Klaip ėda (4 ) netw ork u tilities inŠiau liai.
Figure 5. Employment in Soviet Lithuania, 1960 to 1971 (selected years), in
facilities regulated by the KGB second administration and in the public
sector as a whole
Sou rce:Data for regu lated facilities are from Anušau s kas ,KGB Lietuvoje,p .7 1 ;the originaldata are rep orted for alternate y ears ,1 961 to 1 97 1 .Forthe p u b lics ector,s ee Ts SU,Nar. khoz. 1960,p .63 8 ,and Nar. khoz. 1922-
1972,p .601 .N otes :Annu alav erage grow th rates ofeach s eries are b as ed on firs t andlas t y ears rep orted.The p u b lics ector cov ers alls tate ins titu tions ands tate-ow ned enterp ris es ;the only s ignificant ex clu s ion is collectiv e farm s .Regu lated non-indu s trialfacilities are in trans p ort,com m u nication,andtrade facilities and fis heries .Secu rity clearances are for “s ecret”corres p ondence and ab ov e (“top s ecret”and “s p ecialfile”).
Table 1. The density of informer networks: selected regions and yearsRes identp op u lation,m illions
State s ecu rity s taffandinform ersThou s ands Per thou s andres identsSov iet Union (1 93 5) 1 59.2 500 3 .1Sov iet Lithu ania (1 97 0) 3 .1 1 2.0 3 .8Poland (1 97 0) 3 2.5 3 3 .5 1 .0Poland (1 98 5) 3 7 .0 1 05 2.8Eas t Germ any (1 991 ) 1 5.9 27 0 1 7 .0Sou rces :Pop u lations ,for the Sov iet Union,the av erage offigu res for 1Janu ary 1 93 5 and 1 93 6 from Andreev ,Dars kii,and Khar’kov a,Naselenie,p .1 1 8 ;Sov iet Lithu ania,the cens u s figu re for 1 5 Janu ary 1 97 0 from Ts SU,
Nar. khoz. 1922-1972, p .1 0);Poland and Eas t Germ any ,m id-y ear figu resfrom The Conference Board TotalEconom y Datab as e Janu ary 201 4 ,athttp ://w w w .conference-b oard.org/data/econom y datab as e/(acces s ed 4N ov em b er 20 1 4 ).State s ecu rity em p loy ees and inform ers ,for the Sov ietUnion,Shearer,Policing,p .1 3 6);for the Sov iet Lithu ania KGB,nu m b ers ofem p loy ees ,agents ,and tru s ted p ers ons av eraged ov er 1 969 and 1 97 1from Figu res 2 and 3 ;for the Polis h SB,nu m b ers ofop erativ e s tafffromDu dek and Pacz kow s ki,‘Pols ka’,p .4 20,p lu s inform ers from Ru z ikow s ki,‘Agenci’,p .4 7 ;for the Eas t Germ an Stas i,Bru ce,The Firm,p .1 0.
Table 2. Soviet Lithuania KGB case-load indicators, 1960s (annual average)1 961 to 1 965 1 967 to 1 97 1
Total:Alerts ofop erationals ignificance … 2,53 1Cas es u nder inv es tigation 1 ,592 1 ,1 8 3Pers ons u nder inv es tigation 1 ,601 1 ,21 3Pers ons p ros ecu ted 4 0 3 5
Per 100 employees:Alerts ofop erationals ignificance … 21 1Cas es u nder inv es tigation 1 3 5 99Pers ons u nder inv es tigation 1 3 5 1 01Pers ons p ros ecu ted 3 .4 2.9
Per 100 informers:Alerts ofop erationals ignificance … 25Cas es u nder inv es tigation 24 1 2Pers ons u nder inv es tigation 24 1 2Pers ons p ros ecu ted 0.6 0.3Sou rce:Totals (firs t fou r row s ) are calcu lated from Anušau s kas ,KGB
Lietuvoje,p .7 1 .Other figu res are norm aliz ed b y em p loy ees and inform ers(agents ,and tru s ted p ers ons ) as s how n in Figu res 2 and 3 .The originaldata are rep orted for alternate y ears ,1 961 to 1 97 1 .
Table 3. Kompromat in two dimensions: Panevėžys, December 1972 Circu m s tances Actions TotalH is torical 1 67 55 222Contem p oraneou s 65 3 4 99Total 23 2 8 9 3 21Sou rce:As Ap p endix Tab le A-4 .Units ofm eas u rem ent are item s ofcom p rom is ing ev idence (kom p rom at) held b y the KGB and dis trib u tedov er the 1 7 6 p ers ons cov ered in the s ou rce.
Table 4. Kompromat and the compromised: Panevėžys, December 1972 Contem p oraneou s action? N o Yes DifferenceTotal 1 4 2 3 4 …
Personal dataProb .Ru s s ian 1 % 0% -1 %Prob .Fem ale 3 9% 4 7 % 8 %Av erage age in 1 94 4 1 9.7 21 .9 2.1 1Av erage y ears edu cation 1 0.1 8 .3 -1 .8 1 **Prob .Party or Kom s om ol 6% 1 5% 8 % *
Employment statusProb .Em p loy ed 8 6% 7 9% -7 %Prob .W C/Su p erv is or |Em p loy eda 7 7 % 59% -1 7 % **Prob .Retired 1 0% 1 5% 4 %Prob .H ou s ew ife 4 % 6% 2%
Nature of compromising evidenceProb .H is toricalcircu m s tances :Pers onal 1 8 % 1 2% -7 %Offam ily m em b er 7 % 3 % -4 %Prob .Liab le to res ettlem ent:Pers onally 6% 3 % -3 %As fam ily m em b er 1 9% 6% -1 3 % **Offam ily m em b ers 8 % 3 % -5%Prob .H is toricalaction:Pers onally 1 5% 9% -6%By fam ily m em b er 3 5% 1 5% -20% **Prob .Sentenced:Pers onally 21 % 3 % -1 8 % **Fam ily m em b er 1 3 % 9% -5%Prob .Cu rrent circu m s tances :Pers onally 6% 1 2% 6%Fam ily m em b er ab road 24 % 4 4 % 20% ***Prob .Cu rrent action:By fam ily m em b er 1 % 6% 4 % *Sou rce:As Ap p endix Tab le A-4 .Significance:*p < 0.1 ,** p < 0.05,*** p <0.01 .Significant differences are s how n for inform ation,b u t do not m eritliteralinterp retation b ecau s e ofs election:no one entered the s am p lew ithou t hav ing b een chos en for it b y circu m s tance or v olu ntary action,his toricor contem p oraneou s .a “Prob .W C/Su p erv is or |Em p loy ed”:Prob ab ility ofem p loy m ent in aw hite-collar or s u p erv is ory cap acity ,conditionalon b eing em p loy ed.
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Data appendix
Table A-1. Lithuania and its Soviet neighbours in 1970: summary statisticsLithuania (Rank)a Latvia Belorussia RussiaCensus population(millions) 3.128 (9) 2.364 9.002 130.1
Numbers (per cent of population):Of local ethnicityb 80.1% (4) 56.8% 81.0% 82.8%In urbansettlements 51.0% (6) 64.0% 45.0% 63.0%With secondaryand highereducationc 38.2% (15) 51.7% 44.0% 48.9%Retail turnover,rubles per headd 752 (3) 997 623 740
Value (per cent of 1960) in “unchanged” prices:National income 238% (1) 204% 218% 198%Industrialproduction 303% (2) 248% 294% 215%Industrial labourproductivitye 163% (6) 175% 175% 168%Sources: TsSU, Nar. khoz. 1922-1972, pp. 9, 10, 37, 135, 150, 360, 393,499-599, 516, 531, 544, 556, 569, 581, 594, 607, 619, 631, 644, 657, 669,681).Key:a Rank among 15 Union Republics of the Soviet Union (in reverseorder of population size in 1970, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,Belorussia, Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Moldovia, Lithuania, Kirgizia,Tadzhikistan, Armenia, Latvia, Turkmenistan, and Estonia.) Clockwisefrom the North, Lithuania’s neighbours were the Soviet Republics ofLatvia, Belorussia, the Polish People’s Republic, and Soviet Russia’sKaliningrad enclave in the West.b Local ethnicity: self-declared Lithuanians in Lithuania, Belorussiansin Belorussia, and so on.c Numbers with complete and incomplete secondary and tertiary areshown per cent of the population aged 10 years and over.d Retail turnover in state and cooperative retail establishments,including socialized catering; this left out “collective farm markets” wherefarmers sold produce on their own account. The year is 1971.e Gross value of industrial output per worker.
2
Table A-2. KGBs and census populations: per cent of local nationalityKGB employees Census populationsEstonia1953a 25 …1959b … 74.6Latvia1953c 17.5 …1956d 44 …1958d 55 …1959b … 62.0Lithuania, second administration1957e 53 …1959b … 79.31968f 39 (first dept) …1969g 23 (third dept) …1969h 44 (first dept) …1970j 44 (first dept) 80.11971k 53 (first dept) …1973m 77 (fifth dept) …1979n … 80.01984e 75 …Note: In the Soviet Union, national identity (e.g. Russian, Estonian) wasself-declared for purposes of acquiring personal identity papers and innational censuses. We suppose that the Estonian and Latvian KGB figureswere based on self-declaration. For Lithuania the KGB figures are basedon the ethnic identification of family names given in holiday rosters andcirculation lists found in KGB files. The Lithuanian figures are cover theKGB second administration only and the particular departments shown.We base ethnic identification on family names in vacation rosters andcirculation lists. The KGB did not have unified personnel records; eachadministration had its own card index of employees.Sources:a Estimate provided by Meelis Saueauk (personal correspondence, 29April 2013). According to Tannberg, Politika, p. 116, the same figure foremployees of the Estonia MVD (including both state security and militia atthat time) was 32 per cent.b TsSU, Nar. khoz. 1960, pp. 18-20).c Rahi-Tamm, Jansons, and Kaasik, ‘Estonia’, p. 159.d Rahi-Tamm, Jansons, and Kaasik, ‘Estonia’, pp. 162-163.e Anušauskas, KGB Lietuvoje, p. 87.f Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/659, 237-239 (Lt. Col. Kardanovskii, chief ofLithuania KGB second administration, first department vacation rosterdated 3 January 1968).
3
g Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 17 (Capt. Markūnas, chief of third department of the Lithuania KGB second administration, vacation rosterdated 15 January 1969.h Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/683, 102-104 (Lt. Col. Kardanovskii, chief ofLithuania KGB second administration, first department vacation rosterdated 30 December 1969).j Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/673, 24 (Circulation list of staff of the firstdepartment of the Lithuania KGB second administration for decrees andinstructions of the USSR and Lithuania KGBs, dated 13 February 1970).For an identical list see also Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/683, 105-106 (Lt. Col.Kardanovskii, chief of Lithuania KGB second administration, firstdepartment vacation roster dated 27 January 1969). For census data forthe same year, 1970, see TsSU, Nar. khoz. 1922-1972, p. 594).k Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/683, 100-101 (Lt-Col A. Domarkas, deputy chiefof first department, Lithuania KGB second administration, vacation rosterdated 15 January 1971).m Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/699, 157 (Circulation list of staff of the fifthdepartment of the Lithuania KGB for decrees and instructions of theLithuania KGB for 1973).n TsSU, Nar. khoz. 1922-1982, p. 36.
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Table A-3. Facilities regulated by the Lithuania KGB second administration,
June 1968Facility Fundholder Key
VilniusPlanning Commission [Gosplan] LSSR CM EState Bank [Gosbank] LSSR CM EMin. of Communications LSSR CM NMin. of Land Amelioration and WaterConservation (including theInstitute of Water Conservation) LSSR CM LMin. of Automobile Transport andRoads LSSR CM NChief Admin. of Power andElectrification LSSR CM NChief Admin. of Material and TechnicalSupply LSSR CM NAdmin. of Geology LSSR CM LLithuanian Admin. of Civil Aviation USSR Min. of CivilAviation NAdmin. of Land Reorganization LSSR Min. of Agriculture LVilnius District Admin. of Gas Pipelines USSR Min. of GasIndustry NCentral Statistical Admin. LSSR CM EResearch Institute of Electrography(mailbox G-4602). Does researchand experimental design work onmanufacture of display equipment,computer output devices, anddocument copiers.
USSR Min. of RadioIndustry S
Research Institute of RadarInstruments (mailbox R-6856).Develops new models of radarinstruments.
USSR Min. of RadioIndustry S
Vilnius branch of the All-UnionResearch Institute ofElectrowelding Equipment USSR Min. ofElectrotechnical Industry SRepublican Design Institute for LandOrganization [LSSR] Min. ofAgriculture LInstitute of Geology LSSR CM Admin. ofGeology L
5
Facility Fundholder KeyAssociation “Sigma,” with CentralDesign Bureau of ManagementSystems and “Orgtekhnika”Specialized Design Bureau.Develops and prepares accountingand organization equipment.
USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Vilnius Design Bureau (mailbox no. G-4322). Does research andexperimental design work onmodel integrated circuits andspecial-purpose equipment
USSR Min. of theElectronic Industry S
Vilnius Design Bureau of MagneticRecording (mailbox no. A-3593).Develops sound recordingequipment for Ministry of Defencecontrast and also for needs of thenational economy.
USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry S
Special Design Bureau of theAccounting Equipment Factory.Develops discrete choiceequipment [schetno-reshaiushchieustroistva]
USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Experimental Research Institute formetal Cutting machine tools.Develops and improvesmetalworking machine tools
USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Vilnius Radar Instrument Factory(mailbox V-7859). Produces radarequipment for military purposes USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry SLithuanian Instrumentation Factory(mailbox A-7934). Prepares soundrecording equipment for Ministryof Defence contrast and also forneeds of the national economy.
USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry S
Radio Components Factory (mailboxno. A-7528). Producestransformers for the defenceindustry and also transformers anddeflection systems for televisionsets
USSR Min. of theElectronic Industry S
Vilnius Electrowelding EquipmentFactory (mailbox G-4823) USSR Min. of theElectrotechnical Industry S
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Facility Fundholder KeyVilnius Electrotechnical Factory “Elfa”(mailbox A-7586). Producescompact electrical motors andmagnetic recorders for needs of thenational economy
USSR Min. of theElectrotechnical Industry S
Vilnius Factory of Electrical Meters USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Vilnius Factory of NumericallyControlled Machine Tools (mailboxno. V-2677) USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Vilnius Factory of AccountingEquipment USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Machine Tool Factory “Žalgiris”(mailbox no. V-2936) USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Factory of Building and FinishingMachinery USSR Min. of Buildingand Road Engineering HMachine Tool Factory “Kommunaras” USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Vilnius Power Grid LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NVilnius Thermal Power Central LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NVilnius oil depot LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NDOSAAF Republican committee [USSR DOSAAF] LCivil Defence Staff LSSR [CM] LUnified Air Detachment and VilniusAirport USSR Min. of CivilAviation, LithuanianAdmin. L
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Facility Fundholder KeyVilnius division and lines: Vilnius-Porech’e-Druskininkai, Vilnius-Stasiliai, Vilnius-Turmantas,Vilnius-Šumskas, and Lentvaris-Kaišiadorys
Baltic Railway N
KaunasKaunas Research Institute for RadarEquipment [KNIIRIT] (mailbox no.V-8574). Does exploratory researchon ways and means of creating newradar equipment for Ministry ofDefence contracts and needs of thenational economy
USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry S
Institute for Physical-TechnicalProblems of Power Engineering.Does development work on varioussecret topics in new powerengineering, high-temperaturephysics and cybernetics
LSSR Academy ofSciences S
Republican Institute for Design ofWater Supply “Litgiprovodkhoz” LSSR Min. of Agriculture NInstitute for Industrial ConstructionDesign “Promproekt” [LSSR CM StateConstruction Admin.]“Gosstroi” SKaunas Geodesical, Cartographic, andLand-Organization Departments. Republican DesignInstitute for LandOrganization [of theLSSR Min. of Agriculture]
L
Specialized Administration of RoadBuilding LSSR Min. of RoadTransport and Highways NSpecialized Design Bureau “Vint”(mailbox no. A-1281). Engages inthe development of screwpropellers for Ministry of Defencecontracts
USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry S
Naval Engineering Factory “Piargale”(mailbox no. A-7475). Producesscrew propellers for Ministry ofDefence contracts
USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry S
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Facility Fundholder KeyKaunas Radio Factory (mailbox R-6856) and Specialized DesignBureau USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry SArtificial Textile Fibre Factory LSSR CM Admin. of theChemical Industry SKaunas “Kaunas Energoremont”[Power Repair] Enterprise USSR Min. of Power andElectrification NLithuanian Office for Woodland AerialPhotography All-Union “Lesproekt”Association L“Vodokanal” [Water Supply] Trust LSSR Min. of CommunalServices NWestern Aerial-PhotographyGeodesical Enterprise“Sel’khozaerofots”emka” USSR Min. of Agriculture LKaunas State Power station andPetrashus State District PowerStation LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NKaunas zonal base of “Glavneftesbyt”[Oil Supply Administration] LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NLithuanian Admin. Airport and UnifiedAir Squadron of USSR Min. of CivilAviation NAir Club and Radio Club DOSAAF LKaunas communications office, securecommunications division, and cityand inter-city telephone exchanges LSSR Min. ofCommunications NRadio station and facility no. 603 LSSR Min. ofCommunications NThird district of the cable relayturnpike. Maintains lines ofcommunication, including thosegoing to important secure facilitiesand the international cable
USSR Min. ofCommunications N
Kaunas city and district civil defencestaffs [LSSR CM] LKaunas city railway station and lines:
Kaišiadorys-Linkaičiai, Kaišiadorys-
Kaunas, Palemonas-Gaižūnai, 
Kaunas-Kybartai, Kazlų Rūda-Alytus
Baltic Railway N
Šiauliai
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Facility Fundholder Key
Šiauliai television factory (mailbox no.V-3822) Min. of the RadioIndustry SElectronics factory “Nuklon” (mailbox.No. M-5621). The factory ispresently under construction. Aftercommissioning, the factory willproduce integrated logical circuitsfor Ministry of Defence contracts
Min. of the ElectronicsIndustry S
Šiauliai precision machine tools factory USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrument Industry SBicycle and Motor Factory “Vairus” USSR Min. of theAutomobile Industry HOil depot LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NLand organization base Republican DesignInstitute for LandOrganization [of theLSSR Min. of Agriculture]
L
West-Lithuania HydrogeologicalExpedition LSSR CM Admin. ofGeology LPower grid LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NState District Power Station “Rekiva” LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NGas Supply Administration LSSR Min. of CommunalServices NWater Supply Administration LSSR Min. of theCommunal Economy NSpecialized Road BuildingAdministration, production unit LSSR Min. of RoadTransport and Highways NDistrict network, with facilities: TVrelay station, telephone exchange[lineino-tekhnicheskii uzel], facilityno. 60, secure communicationfacility [spetssviaz’], cable unit no.33
Min. of Communication N
Civil Defence Staff [LSSR CM] L
10
Facility Fundholder KeyRailways of the Šiauliai division andlines: Šiauliai-Eglaine, Radviliškis-
Pagėgiai, Šiauliai-Lukšiai, and 
Šiauliai-[illegible]
Baltic Railway N
KlaipėdaKlaipėda Shipbuilding Factory “Baltija”(mailbox no. N-5832) USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry HExperimental Ship Repair Factory(mailbox no. V-2677) USSR Min. of Fisheries SWorkshop no. 2 (mailbox no. 109) ofthe Riga Enterprise “Era”. Engagesin electrical installation work onvessels of the fishing fleet andNavy.
USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry S
Ship Repair Factory no. 7 USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet H
Klaipėda division of the State DesignInstitute of the Fishing Fleet USSR Min. of Fisheries L
Klaipėda trading port USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet L
Klaipėda Maritime Agency USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet LRadio facility no. 61. Engages injamming radio broadcasts ofcapitalist states LSSR Min. ofCommucations N
Klaipėda oil export entrepôt LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NBases USSR Min. of Fisheries L
Klaipėda Seafaring College USSR Min. of Fisheries LCoastal Weather Station USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet LCity Communications Network LSSR Min. ofCommucations NPower Grid and State District PowerStation LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NCivil Defence Staff [LSSR CM] LDOSAAF [USSR DOSAAF] L
Klaipėda railway network and lines:
Klaipėda-Skuodas, Kretinga-Kužiai, 
and Klaipėda-Pagėgiai 
Baltic Railway N
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Facility Fundholder Key
PanevėžysEkranas Cathode Ray Tube Factory(mailbox no. V-2963) USSR Min. of theElectronics Industry SAutomobile Compressor Factory USSR Min. of theAutomobile Industry SPrecision Mechanical Factory.Produces visual-display accountingequipment Sigma Association S
Panevėžys oil depot LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NCity DOSAAF and Civil Aviation landingstrip [USSR DOSAAF] LCity and District Civil Defence Staffs [LSSR CM] LDistrict communications network LSSR Min. ofCommucations N
MažeikiaiCompressor Factory USSR Min. of Engineeringfor the Light and FoodIndustry and HouseholdEquipment
S
Akmenė Cement Factory LSSR Min. of BuildingMaterials H
Elektrėnai
Elektrėnai State District Power Station LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification N
Kėdainiai
Kėdainiai Chemical Combine LSSR CM Admin. of theChemical Industry. H
Jonava:Nitrogenous Fertilizer Factory LSSR CM Admin. of theChemical Industry. HSource: The words in the first two columns are abstracted fromHoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 120-132 (Col. Naras, chief of Lithuania KGBsecond administration, ‘List of institutions, organizations, and enterprisesof the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic at which it is necessary for theLithuanian SSR KGB to maintain counter-intelligence work’, dated 18 June
12
1968). Text in [square brackets] is inserted. The third column is ourattribution, based on the key below.Key: Definition Scope of activityE Economic regulators Accounting, planning, and financial servicesH Heavy industryfacilities Shipyards, fertilizer plants, and otherproduction without a clear research ordevelopmental orientationL Location-basedactivities Ports, airports, civil defence and bordersecurity, and activities linked to resourceexploitation involving cartography andaerial photographyN Network utilities Power, gas, and water supplies, railways,highways, mail and cable services.S Science-basedresearch orproduction Research, development, testing, andexperimental facilities and electronicproducts.Abbreviations:DOSAAF Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force,and NavyLSSR Lithuanian Soviet Socialist RepublicCM Council of MinistersMin. MinistryAdmin. Administration (usually a functional or territorial subdivisionof a ministry)
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Table A-4. Kompromat and persons compromised: Panevėžys, 1972 
All Refusedtravel In post Cleared RefusedclearancePersons, total 176 96 79 6 10
Personal dataProb. Russian 1% 2% 0% 0% 0%Prob. Female 41% 66% 15% 17% 0%Average age 1944 20.2 24.2 15.7 10.8 10.6Average yearseducation 9.6 7.5 12.5 13.3 14.2Prob. Party orKomsomol 8% 4% 10% 67% 30%
Labour market statusProb. Employed 85% 71% 100% 100% 100%Prob. WC/Supervisor |Employeda 73% 45% 97% 83% 100%Prob. Retired 11% 21% 0% 0% 0%Prob. Housewife 4% 8% 0% 0% 0%
Nature of compromising evidence (percent of persons in column)Prob. Historicalcircumstances:Personal 17% 14% 19% 17% 50%Of family member 6% 4% 9% 33% 10%Prob. Liable toresettlement:Personally 5% 7% 3% 0% 0%As family member 16% 9% 25% 17% 40%Of family members 7% 5% 9% 17% 30%Prob. Historical action:Personally 14% 14% 14% 0% 0%By family member 31% 33% 29% 50% 50%Prob. Sentenced:Personally 18% 8% 29% 0% 0%Average term, years| Sentenced 12.7 12.0 12.9 … …Family member 13% 14% 9% 17% 20%Prob. Currentcircumstances:Personally 7% 10% 3% 0% 0%Family memberabroad 28% 45% 9% 0% 20%Prob. Current action:Personal 19% 29% 4% 0% 50%By family member 2% 2% 1% 17% 10%Source and notes: see next page.
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Source: Calculated from personal data in a series of documents, all from
Lt. Col. Kishonas, chief of Panevėžys KGB, and dated 2 or 3 December 1972: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/703, 90-91 ( ‘List of persons cleared for topsecret work and documents with compromising evidence’), 92-93 (‘List[of persons] with compromising evidence, who have been refusedclearance, but continue to work in positions indicated’), 94-109 (‘List ofpersons denied travel abroad for 1970/72’), 110-122 (‘List withcompromising evidence on persons occupying leading positions’, dated 3December 1972).a “Prob. WC/Supervisor | Employed”: Probability of employment in awhite-collar or supervisory capacity, conditional on being employed.
